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This article comments on Danie Strauss’s Philosophy: Discipline of the disciplines. It deals with 
some differences between the author’s interpretation of the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic 
Idea and the views of Dooyeweerd and Strauss. I call these differences ‘nuances’ because our 
religious starting point is the same. This implies a realist religious view, confessing that God 
created the world according to laws which are invariant because He sustains them. We know 
God only through Jesus Christ, who submitted himself to God’s laws. Partial knowledge of 
God’s laws can be achieved by studying the law-conformity of the creation. In particular, I 
shall discuss the relevance of artefacts for the future development of the Philosophy of the 
Cosmonomic Idea.
Introduction 
In this article I want to draw attention to artefacts, a specific kind of object, which should play 
a much larger part in the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea (PCI for short) than is realised 
up till now. Sections 2–4 deal with modal analysis, knowledge of laws, and analogies. Sections 
5–7 concern characters, types of artefact and the philosophy of technology. Section 8 discusses 
time and history. This choice is inspired by Danie Strauss’s Philosophy: Discipline of the disciplines 
(Strauss 2009, to be abbreviated as PDD), a major contribution to the development of PCI in the 
21st century, on which I shall make some marginal comments.
Like Herman Dooyeweerd and Danie Strauss, I distinguish general or modal laws from specific 
or typical laws (Strauss 2009:25–26, 79–82). With respect to a given law, something is called a 
subject if it directly or actively satisfies that law. It is an object if it indirectly or passively satisfies 
that law. The ontological status of an object depends on a subject in a subject–object relationship. 
Therefore it is acceptable to speak of the ‘subject side’ of the creation in contrast to its ‘law side’, 
but ‘subject and object side’ may be better. I would not recommend ‘factual side’ (ibid:76–77, 
436), because I take a fact to be an objective expression of human knowledge. Within a certain 
discourse, something is considered a ‘fact’ (as opposed to a ‘hypothesis’) if everybody concerned 
agrees with it. It is a human-made statement about a law or about its correlates. A fact is an object, 
unfit for naming the subject and object side of reality in which subjects come first.
Modal analysis
A basic axiom of PCI is that both modal laws and typical laws are grouped into mutually 
irreducible sets. A set of typical laws forms a character, to be discussed below (ss. 5–7). A set of 
general or modal laws forms a law sphere, a modal aspect of reality and of human experience, 
for which Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is best known. Strauss’s PDD is mostly concerned with the 
critical conceptual analysis of the modal aspects (concepts like ‘subject side’, ‘lawfulness’, ‘law 
conformity’, ‘concept-transcending ideas’, the ‘core-meaning’ of the modal aspects and their 
‘analogies’, ‘continuity’, ‘molecular biology’, etc.). Unfortunately, his analysis does not criticise 
the term ‘sphere sovereignty’. Like Dooyeweerd, Strauss (2009:456) calls the mutual irreducibility 
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of the modal aspects ‘sphere sovereignty’, as if there was a 
sovereign residing in each aspect.
The term ‘sphere sovereignty’ was put forward by Abraham 
Kuyper in the 19th century (and by others before him, 
Strauss 2009:22, 24), to defend the thesis of the mutual 
independence of organised associations such as church, 
state and university, using their mutually irreducible 
typical character as an argument (Stafleu 2004). Like many 
other people confusing Kuyper’s argument with his thesis, 
Herman Dooyeweerd interprets the political view of sphere 
sovereignty as the ontological principle of creational diversity. 
For example, Dooyeweerd (1953–1958, I:101–102) applies 
the term ‘sphere sovereignty’ to the mutual irreducibility of 
the modal aspects, ignoring the fact that no modal aspect is 
ruled by a sovereign. He puts sphere sovereignty at the law 
side of reality, applying it to both modal aspects and types. 
However, a sovereign is a political subject (whether a person 
or a government), even if they translate normative principles 
into laws or rules. If we define an association or corporation 
as an organised human community having a leader or a 
governing board (Stafleu 2004, 2011:s. 4.0), the political 
principle of sphere sovereignty applies to all associations. It 
expresses their being subjects besides individual people in 
all normative relation frames. According to Dooyeweerd, 
the university (as a type) would have sphere sovereignty 
with respect to the state, whereas I believe that types do 
not have sovereigns or sovereignty. The principle of sphere 
sovereignty implies that any university (as an individual 
association) should have sphere sovereignty with respect 
to any state. Contrary to Dooyeweerd’s view, mine has the 
consequence that two universities have sphere sovereignty 
with respect to each other. However, I fully agree that the 
university as a type is irreducible to the type of the state.
Dooyeweerd and Strauss distinguish 15 modal aspects. To 
these I have added the political relation frame preceding the 
juridical one (Stafleu 2004, 2011:s.1.8). Strauss summarily 
rejects this proposal (Strauss 2009:506, where he refers to 
Basden 2005, but does not consider my reply; Stafleu 2005). 
However, several arguments in its favour can easily be found 
in his discussion of the structure of the state (Strauss 2009:534–
559) and the above discussion of sphere sovereignty.
About the linear order of the six natural aspects most PCI 
investigators agree. Strauss (2009) accepts Dooyeweerd’s 
order of the normative aspects, but otherwise opinions, 
including mine, differ widely (Stafleu 2004, 2011:ch. 1). He 
observes that I have misquoted him on the position of the 
logical aspect (see Strauss 2009:258–259 in relation to Stafleu 
2007). I concede my mistake and apologise, although my 
comment was a paraphrase. His rebuttal seems to imply, 
however, that his original argument says nothing about the 
position of the logical aspect immediately after the natural 
ones, as I understood it was intended to do.
Contrary to Dooyeweerd and Strauss, I always stressed 
(and not only recently [see Strauss 2009:459; Stafleu 1970]) 
that the modal laws concern relationships, both subject–subject 
relationships and subject–object relationships. Dooyeweerd’s A 
new critique of theoretical thought (1953–1958) only discusses the 
latter, but elsewhere he also considers the former. Because of 
these relationships, I prefer to call the modal aspects ‘relation 
frames’ (Stafleu 2002:ch. 1, 2011:ch. 1; Strauss 2009:456–457).
In my experience, the mutual irreducibility of the modal 
aspects is difficult to be argued by the designation of their 
‘core meaning’ like ‘energy effect’ or ‘life’ (Strauss 2009:89–
92). It can better be made clear by paying attention to the 
modal subject–subject relationships. If one recognises that 
all physical subject–subject relationships are expressions 
of interaction, it is almost obvious that physics cannot be 
reduced to mathematical relationships, because mathematical 
things such as triangles do not interact. However, physical 
interactions can be projected on kinetic, spatial and 
quantitative relationships, allowing them to be measured. 
Interaction now generally takes the form of current, force 
and energy (Stafleu 2002:ch. 5; Strauss 2009:466). Therefore it 
is confusing to consider ‘energy effect’ or ‘energy operation’ 
to be the core meaning of the physical aspect, as Strauss 
(2009:89–90, 457) maintains in line with Dooyeweerd, and 
ascribes to me (Strauss 2009:398), though I have objected to 
it. He refers to the original meaning of the Greek energeia, 
ignoring the changed meaning of energy in the physical 
sciences, in technology and, in fact, in our whole culture 
since the second half of the 19th century. So it may appear as 
if antique Greek disciplines Strauss’s philosophy.
In the biotic aspect one easily recognises the genetic relationship 
as the modal subject–subject relationship, between individual 
living beings, between the cells of a growing plant or animal 
and between different species. Descent and heredity do 
not occur in physical relationships, and this provides an 
argument for the thesis that the biotic and the physical aspects 
are mutually irreducible. But the genetic relationships can be 
projected onto physical and chemical relationships between 
molecules such as DNA and RNA. In the biological theory of 
evolution, the assumption that every living being descends 
from another is fundamental. Therefore this theory is not 
applicable to physical and chemical development, in which 
heredity makes no sense, nor can it explain the emergence of 
the first living beings on earth.
Knowledge of laws requires the 
application of artefacts
Because human experience fully depends on relationships, 
the relation frames constitute aspects of human experience. 
This includes our experience of laws, both modal and 
typical. Dooyeweerd assumes that a knowledge of modal 
laws requires a transcendental approach, including the so-
called Gegenstand relationship, in which the logical aspect 
is intentionally opposed to all modal aspects. Strauss 
rejects this relationship, and I agree with him. In contrast, 
Dooyeweerd assumes that natural or naive experience lies 
at the basis of our awareness of typical structures. I believe 
that any kind of law can only be found in an empirical way 
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(Strauss 2009:432). We have no direct knowledge of laws. 
But because individuals and their mutual relationships can 
be experienced both naturally and indirectly via scientific 
investigation, their lawfulness or law-conformity warrants 
the possibility of finding laws from scientific investigation 
(Strauss 2009:436). Generally speaking, characters are found 
by induction and modal laws for relationships are arrived at 
by abstraction (Strauss 2009:81, 422). In both cases, science 
works with hypothetical statements about laws, trying to 
corroborate these statements by confronting them with states 
of affairs considered as facts and by relating them. This 
means that our knowledge of laws is always tentative and 
liable to correction.
Statements of laws made in theories are human artefacts 
and must therefore be distinguished from the laws 
themselves. Nominalists do not recognise laws apart from 
these statements (they only recognise individuals, Strauss 
2009:446), whereas realists assume that statements of laws 
refer to real laws (Strauss 2009:432–436; Stafleu 1999). PCI’s 
realist religious view implies the assumption of the reality 
of invariant laws, which, though they are not rational or 
intelligent, are nevertheless intelligible, that is, knowable 
and understandable. Laws are not to be conceived as the 
cause of regularities in a physicalist sense, nor as expressing 
God’s will in a psychologistic sense. Nominalist philosophies 
such as logical positivism dominated the philosophy of 
science during two-thirds of the 20th century. Physicists 
even avoided calling their discoveries ‘laws’, taking refuge 
in a number of terms such as ‘principle’ or ‘postulate’. 
(I have not recommended this use, as Strauss [2009:435] 
claims.) Biologists often believed that laws can only be 
physical. However, during the last third of the 20th century, 
philosophers of science tended to become more realistic.
My view of theoretical work is much simpler than that of 
Dooyeweerd and Strauss (see Stafleu 1987). Both humans 
and some or all animals (in a limited sense, see Stafleu 2002:s. 
7.5) experience their world as being lawful, but only people 
use theories to explore these. Therefore I would start from 
the assumption that theories are logically qualified artefacts, 
human products. Theoretical thought is nothing but thought 
aided by theories, which in turn depend on artefacts such 
as statements and concepts. Therefore, whereas natural or 
naive thought is directly related to individuals and their 
relationships, theoretical thought is indirect, mediated by 
artefacts, just as viewing a microbe is an act that has been 
aided by an artefact, a microscope. 
An obvious objection to this view could be that theories are 
products of theoretical thought, and for this reason cannot 
be its starting point. I reject the ‘transcendental idea’ (of 
Immanuel Kant and pursued by Dooyeweerd) that it would 
be possible to start theoretical thought from something that 
is not theoretical, an a priori Archimedian point of view 
transcending human thought. Human beings happen to 
use theories, and philosophers are able to investigate the 
structure of thought, but only by applying theories. If this is a 
circle, then the point is to get into it. The transcendental idea 
was an attempt to justify theoretical thought and to arrive at 
certain knowledge, which I don’t believe is possible. 
Accepting the realist view that natural laws were functioning 
before human beings entered the world, conditioning their 
existence, including their ability to think naturally, means 
to accept that these laws transcend human experience in an 
ontological sense. However, this does not mean that there 
is a transcendental way to achieve knowledge of the laws 
(either natural or normative). These can only be discovered in 
an empirical way, and are tentatively formulated with the 
help of theories and other artefacts. In my view, this applies 
both to modal and to typical laws, both to natural laws and 
to normative principles, even if the methods for arriving at 
reliable results differ considerably.
Dooyeweerd identifies theoretical thought with science 
and philosophy. However, science not only uses theories, 
statements and concepts, but many other kinds of artefact 
as well. For instance, modern natural science makes use of 
a large variety of technical apparatus. Natural science and 
the humanities apply statistics. Each of them has its own 
method of applying artefacts. On the other hand, people 
who cannot be called scientists also use theories, although 
the development of theories may be called scientific. In this, 
I define science and the humanities as activities (theoretical 
or otherwise) directed at achieving knowledge about laws.
Analogies
The modal aspects or relation frames are supposed to be 
mutually irreducible. Nevertheless, they are intimately 
related by referring to each other. In the order of the modal 
aspects, forward references are called ‘anticipations’ (or 
‘antecipations’, as Strauss prefers); backward references 
are called retrocipations. In his conceptual analysis, Strauss 
(2009:430) applies his distinction of ‘concepts’ relating to 
a modal aspect and the preceding ones, and ‘transcending 
concepts’ or ‘ideas’, including the succeeding aspects. 
Contrary to Dooyeweerd and Strauss, I avoid the term 
‘analogies’ for these references, for the following reasons.
Firstly, analogies are not peculiar to the modal aspects. Also 
characters (see below) are often analogous. The theories 
of sound and of light are very much analogous, having 
the same character types, yet sound and light are different 
phenomena, having differing characters and being subject to 
different laws.
Secondly, Strauss defines analogical concepts correctly 
as having similarities and differences. Clearly, ‘analogy’ 
is a logical relationship, as its name suggests, and it serves 
Strauss’s conceptual analysis of the modal aspects very well. 
However, the relationships between the modal aspects are 
first of all ontological, not logical.
Thirdly, the connections between the modal aspects are much 
more than analogies. For example, they allow the projection 
of physical relationships onto quantitative, spatial and kinetic 
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ones, such that these become measurable. This accounts for 
the mathematisation of the physical sciences in a way that 
cannot be comprehended as a mere analogy (Wigner 1960). 
My view of the modal aspects as relation frames implies that 
subject–subject relationships and subject–object relationships 
in one relation frame can be projected onto those in another 
frame in such detail that the laws from one frame can be 
applied in another one in a very fruitful way. The history 
of physics shows that physical laws can be expressed in 
mathematical formulas, and that mathematical laws can 
be applied to physical relationships. Besides relationships, 
physical structures such as crystals can be projected onto 
mathematical ones, such as groups. Therefore I suggest 
that the term ‘retrocipation’ be replaced by ‘projection’; to 
maintain ‘anticipation’; and to avoid ‘analogy’, except in 
conceptual analysis.
Characters
Besides the modal aspects, Dooyeweerd introduced typical 
structures of individuality. It is not always clear whether 
he speaks of the law side (structure for individuals) or the 
individual side (structure of individuals, see Strauss 2009:26, 
399, 450–451, 458). Dooyeweerd also did not sufficiently 
stress that individuals always satisfy a set of specific laws. 
He did not recognise that typically different individuals 
may share some specific laws, whilst differing with respect 
to other specific laws. For instance, electrons share several 
typical laws with neutrinos (both are involved in beta-
radioactivity), but also have some different laws (electrons 
are electrically charged, and therefore subject to Coulomb’s 
law, which neutrinos are typically not). Therefore these 
individuals belong to different though related kinds (Stafleu 
2002:s. 5.2).
In order to avoid these misunderstandings, I proposed the 
term character for the law side of typicality (Stafleu 2002:ch. 
1, 2011:s. 0.1; Strauss 2009:459–463). A character is a set of 
typical laws characterising a specific kind. It determines both 
a subjective class of individuals and an objective ensemble of 
possible variations within a kind.
At the subject and object side of characters one finds 
individual things, events, plants, animals, humans, acts, 
artefacts and associations. The modal subject–subject 
relationships and subject–object relationships concern all 
these typical individuals. They also include the relationships 
of persons and their associations with their God. Christians 
believe that these relationships are mediated by Jesus Christ, 
who became a man observing God’s laws, in order to restore 
humankind, God’s image-bearers, in all these relationships. 
Therefore, in order to know God and to love him, one does 
not need to transcend temporal reality or the order of the 
modal aspects. In fact, one’s relationship to God is fully 
temporal and expressed in all relation frames.
Apart from the correlation of the law side and the subject-
and-object side, the modal aspects and the characters are also 
correlated. In this respect, the relation frames take priority 
above the characters. Like Dooyeweerd and Strauss, I assume 
that each character is primarily typically qualified by one of 
the relation frames. Like Dooyeweerd and Strauss, I assume 
that each character is secondarily founded in a preceding 
frame (with the obvious exception of characters qualified by 
the first one). It turns out to be difficult to define the exact 
meaning of ‘foundation’. Moreover, in the investigation of 
some character, it is not always easy to find its founding 
relation frame. 
Finally, I assume that each character has the tertiary disposition 
to be interlaced with other characters. Dooyeweerd calls 
this phenomenon enkapsis (Strauss 2009:356, 466), that is, 
encapsulation. Contrary to Strauss (2009:467–468), I assume 
that this is the case both on the law side and the subject-and-
object side. I consider the former a condition for the latter. A 
proton and an electron can become interlaced into a neutral 
hydrogen atom only because their characters determine that 
both have exactly the same but opposite electric charge. 
Interlacement should play an important part in the discussion 
of the emergence of new individuals belonging to new kinds 
with sometimes entirely new properties (Stafleu in press). 
For example, molecules are primarily physically qualified, 
secondarily founded in the spatial aspect (because of their 
typical spatial structure), having the disposition to become 
typically interlaced in the character of living cells.
Along these lines, a theory of types is developed, both for 
natural and for normative characters (Stafleu 2002; 2011). 
By way of example, in sections 6–7 (‘Types of artefact’ and 
‘Philosophy of technology’), I review the character types of 
technical things, events and processes.
Types of artefact
Like Dooyeweerd and Strauss, I distinguish natural relation 
frames from normative ones, and natural kinds from 
normative kinds. On the law side, natural frames are sets of 
natural laws; normative frames are sets of values and norms. 
I suppose values or normative principles to be universal and 
invariant. Norms then take shape in human life as historical 
and cultural products arising from relationships between 
humans and within human associations. In the normative 
frames, only individual persons and organised associations 
(which I distinguish from unorganised communities with 
a network structure) can be subjects, everything else being 
an object in the normative aspects. Both individuals and 
associations develop norms to be applied in associations or in 
communities. In the first case, the norms become compulsory 
on the authority of a governing body; in the second case, 
on the authority of the state. However, many norms are not 
compulsory.
Artefacts have a character of their own, a set consisting 
of natural laws, normative principles and norms (Stafleu 
2011:ch. 3). A norm is a human-made culturally and 
historically determined artefact, characterised by the 
normative principle from which it is derived. Norms are 
very flexible and so are all artefacts. Also associations and 
communities differ widely because of their history and 
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culture (Stafleu 2011:chs. 4, 5). It appears possible, however, 
to find character types of artefacts and associations consisting 
of natural laws and normative principles only. For instance, 
one may recognise the universal character type of the state or 
the church, although the application of culturally determined 
norms leads to a large variety of different characters of states 
and churches. These can be compared with the help of the 
supposedly invariant normative character types.
I define artefacts as objects having a character primarily 
qualified by one of the normative relation frames. 
Technically qualified artefacts, like tools, have a single 
character, secondarily founded in one of the natural relation 
frames. Other artefacts (like paintings) have a dual character 
(Stafleu 2003). Their generic character is qualified by a relation 
frame such as the aesthetic one in the case of a painting, and 
founded in the technical one. It characterises a painting as a 
piece of art. Its specific character makes a distinction between 
different types of art. This leads to a typology of artefacts, 
just as there is a typology of associations and of communities.
Philosophy of technology
One consequence of my alternative view of history is to 
replace the ‘historical aspect’ by the ‘technical’ one, as is 
done by several adherents of PCI. Like Dooyeweerd, Strauss 
objects to the designation ‘techno-formative’, ‘for then its 
meaning is restricted to subject–object relations only’ (Strauss 
2009:95). However, the Greek techne means skill, and people 
learn new skills from each other, implying a subject–subject 
relationship (Stafleu 2011:s. 2.1). For the development of a 
philosophy of technology within the framework of PCI, an 
analysis of technical artefacts is crucial, though by no means 
sufficient. Philosophy of technology requires an investigation 
into technically characterised processes (Verkerk et al. 2007); 
into labour associations like a household, a farm, a factory 
or a school (Stafleu 2011:s. 4.1; Verkerk 2004); and into the 
technical infrastructure of any society (Stafleu 2011:s. 5.1). 
Last but not least, it requires a thorough knowledge of the 
history of technology and of its relevance to society at large.
A technical artefact is an object, designed, made and used 
by people in their technically skilled labour, individually or 
working in a group. It is secondarily typified by one of the 
natural relation frames. Projections of the technical relation 
frame onto the preceding natural frames define six secondary 
types of technical activity. The following impression may 
illustrate that skilful activity is as old as humanity, almost 
everywhere present, historically grown, and showing 
enormous progress, especially since the 20th century.
Counting and calculating are secondarily quantitatively 
characterised skills: As a science, mathematics researches 
the quantitative and the spatial relation frame with the 
characters qualified by these frames. Mathematics is also a 
skill, the technique of counting and calculating. From earliest 
times, children have learned to count with their fingers or 
using a bead frame. In mental arithmetic they apply all kinds 
of technical tricks, such as the multiplication tables and 
long division. An early application of arithmetic was book-
keeping. Later on, mathematics was applied to the sciences 
and the humanities and in many practical situations. In 
order to solve a problem one makes a mathematical model, 
allowing calculations and providing quantitative insight. 
Statistics is a well-known example of this. For making models 
and exerting calculations we use an abacus, a slide rule, an 
adding machine, a calculator, a till or a computer.
Orientating, measuring, forming and building are 
secondarily spatially typified acts: Labour leads to 
formation, transformation, and reformation, usually with the 
help of tools. Philosophers of technology sometimes restrict 
technical labour to material transformation, to production. 
However, forming refers to the spatial relation frame and 
is therefore unfit on its own and by itself to characterise 
all technical labour. People try to bring order to their 
perceptions and so orient themselves in spatial terms. For 
both they use instruments, such as a compass or a measuring 
rod. The science of space is called ‘geometry’, having arisen 
long ago from surveying areas where large rivers regularly 
overflow the adjacent countryside. The aim of measurement 
is to collect quantitative data fit for calculations, for instance 
for the collection of taxes. This is possible only if some kind 
of law conformity exists for the magnitudes to be measured, 
for example, a metric system. In the 19th century measuring 
instruments were mainly based on optics and mechanics, 
nowadays mainly on electronics, including finding the 
position of aeroplanes, ships, cars and mobile telephones 
with the aid of a global positioning system.
People move mostly with carriages: Human beings have 
much more freedom of moving around than any animal. 
The most natural motion of people is walking, but even that 
is learned and technically supported by shoes, pavement 
and staircases. A person may master many more ways 
to move, think of the motions required for a sport such as 
basketball. More often we move on a bicycle, in carriages, 
boats, aeroplanes, in lifts and on escalators. The wheel as 
the archetypal invention dates from about 3400 BC, but 
it was not until the 16th century that the Spaniards could 
introduce it to Central America. Navigation is a technical 
problem for sailing rivers and seas, since the 17th century 
it has been greatly improved by the development of clocks. 
Modern traffic came about when natural energy sources 
such as running water, wind and animals were replaced 
by steam engines in trains and ships, petrol engines in cars 
and aeroplanes, and electromotors everywhere else. Besides 
moving themselves, people transport goods and energy. 
Images, opinions and information move around the earth, 
and nowadays such transportation occurs electronically, by 
telephone, radio, television and the internet.
With machines people transform energy or matter: Many 
people associate technology with the use of machines. 
Therefore, the transformation of energy and matter, as in 
the chemical industry, seems to characterise technology. 
Nevertheless, this kind of transformation determines only 
one of six secondary types of technology. The use of fire is one 
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of the oldest human skills. The inventions of processing stone, 
bronze and iron mark the beginning of the archaeological 
eras. In physical labour, too, people transform matter and 
energy. Corporeal labour is a physically founded technical 
act, even if supported by tools and machines. Tools are 
presumably much older than we have data to confirm their 
use, but machines to transform natural energy into a form 
useful for people date from the Middle Ages. Watermills and 
windmills were not invented in Western Europe, but were 
applied there for the first time on a large scale for grinding 
corn, sawing wood, making article and draining swamps. 
The Industrial Revolution started when the working of iron 
and the winning of coal made the construction of steam 
engines both possible and necessary. The first steam engines 
were put to work in coal mines.
Agriculture is a biotically founded technology: Agriculture 
as the development of living nature has experienced several 
reforms, recognisable as such only after the fact (Jonas 
1979:192). The first land reform was the transition from 
nomadic cattle breeding to agriculture. The prosperity of 
the later European Middle Ages is reducible to a second 
land reform (Duby [1961–1962:13] 1984). Meanwhile, in 
China agriculture developed in a no less revolutionary way 
(Landes 1998:41–46.). In about 1100 agricultural production 
increased strongly, partly because of an improved climate, 
but in particular because of improved methods. One of these 
was the invention of deep ploughs, vehicles on wheels, 
which could till the land with greater efficiency and more 
effectively than hitherto. Another method is crop rotation. 
By alternately cultivating a field and letting it lie fallow the 
next year, one prevents plant disease and the exhaustion 
of the soil. An improved method turned out to be a cycle 
of three years: to grow one harvest in the spring of the first 
year, a different one in the autumn of the second year and to 
let the field lie fallow during the third year. This increased 
production by one-half. A third improvement was the 
introduction of shoes and a breast harness for horses. The 
older method of a harness around the neck is suited to oxen, 
but not for horses. Horses are not much stronger than oxen, 
but they are faster and able to work longer, in fact for about 
two more hours a day. Especially the latter attribute meant 
that the transition from oxen to horse traction did not occur 
everywhere without protests, for the labourers had to work 
longer. In southern Europe oxen remained more common. 
One reason is that horses need different fodder (oats), which 
the farmers first had to learn to grow, but which fitted into 
the three-year cycle. Increasingly, farmers started to grow 
materials such as flax for the emerging fabric industry as they 
continued to cultivate food for their own use as well as for 
sale in the growing centres of population. 
Further agricultural reform followed in the 19th century and 
20th century, influenced by industrialisation; and so we have 
seen the mechanisation of agriculture and the introduction of 
artificial fertilisers. Through scientific research and schooling, 
agriculture and cattle raising received a better theoretically 
justified basis. The ‘Green Revolution’ (about 1960–1980) 
meant the introduction of a new agricultural technology in 
the Third World, so much so that there is sufficient food for 
the whole world population. Where there is still a shortage of 
food, it is said to be caused by faulty distribution, disasters, 
wars, corruption, exploitation, managerial impotence and 
plain poverty (Achterhuis 1988:311–328). 
In the final decades of the 20th century, information 
technology was introduced into modern agriculture. 
Fertilising, irrigating, draining land, feeding cattle, milking 
cows and processing agrarian products are now automated 
to a large extent. Although all agricultural technology is 
biotically founded, the term biotechnology now refers in a 
more restricted way to genetic manipulation. Improving 
plant and animal species is as old as mankind, but the 
genetic influencing of breeding is specifically a 20th century 
technology. Since the second agrarian revolution the number 
of agrarian labourers has decreased, but only since the second 
half of the 20th century has less than half of the working 
population been employed in agriculture.
Control is a psychically typified technical act: People have 
always used animals as a source of food and clothing, as a 
means of transport, to exert labour and to support various 
kinds of activity, such as hunting or safeguarding. Except 
for food and the production of clothes, animals cannot 
be used directly; they first have to be tamed and trained, 
domesticated and controlled. Cattle breeders try to increase 
the products of animals in the form of meat, milk, eggs or 
labour performances. The genetic manipulation of animals 
is not modern: only some methods, such as artificial 
insemination, are. In terms of their use in transport and 
as a source of labour, animals have almost disappeared 
in modern countries. Increasingly, they can be found as 
domestic animals and in many kinds of sport. 
Besides animal behaviour, all technical acts are controlled. 
This receives special attention if control is a separate part of a 
technical process. In particular, during the 20th century this 
has led to the introduction of automated processes of many 
kinds. Automation is not only an instrumental phenomenon; 
it also occurs in individual human acts. Several kinds of 
activity or skill (such as cycling) we have to learn first, with all 
the inevitable pains that go along with mastering such skills 
and forming bodily habits and instincts. We develop skills 
by habituation, so that they become automatic responses, 
imprinted fixed-action patterns in our brains.
In a tradition related to PCI, a Christian philosophy of 
technology has been developed by Henk van Riessen, 
Egbert Schuurman and others (Verkerk et al. 2007). Though 
they occasionally refer to PCI, they do not make use of its 
fundamental distinctions as described above. A philosophy 
of technology within the framework of PCI – including 
analysing technical artefacts according to the sketch given in 
the present section – does not yet, in my opinion, exist.
Time and history
From the start, it has been my aim to develop Dooyeweerd’s 
challenging idea of cosmic time. Only recently, I discovered 
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that my conception of time differs considerably from 
Dooyeweerd’s, and by implication from that of Strauss 
(2009:206–211). Two trends are discernible in Dooyeweerd’s 
view of time (see Stafleu 2008). 
According to the first trend, time expresses itself in the 
transcendental serial order of the modal aspects, anticipating 
religion via the aspect of faith. In his or her heart, the 
religious centre of his existence, a human being transcends 
all temporal diversity. I reject this transcendental conception 
of time, supposed to transcend reality (which Dooyeweerd 
1960:137 weakened considerably), because I believe that only 
the eternal God transcends temporal reality, albeit that in 
the person of Jesus Christ God is immanently present in the 
creation and its history. In this trend Dooyeweerd considers 
each modal aspect to be an aspect of time, because in the 
retrocipations and anticipations the temporal order of the 
modal aspects is simultaneously present in all aspects.
In the second trend, each modal aspect has its own order 
of time. Now the serial order is the quantitative order of 
before and after, and simultaneity is the spatial order of time. 
(Dooyeweerd 1953–1958, I:31–32; II:79, 85; I:28; II:102 briefly 
mentions kinetic, biotic, and logical time.) I interpret time 
according to the second trend as an ordering that directs 
relationships. In each relation frame, time expresses itself 
on the law side as a directive order, on the subject and 
object side as relationships between subjects and objects, as 
discussed above (Stafleu 2011:ch. 1). This relational nature of 
time is absent in Dooyeweerd’s work. He calls the ‘factual’ 
side of time ‘duration’, different for various individualities 
(Dooyeweerd 1953–1958, I:28).
Dooyeweerd (1953–1958, II:181–365) considers history to 
consist of the ‘opening up’ of the modal aspects, to begin 
with the ‘historical’ or ‘cultural’ modal aspect (which I call 
the ‘technical relation frame’). This process is guided by the 
aspect of faith as opened up by religion. In Dooyeweerd’s 
conception of history, the serial order of the modal aspects 
or law spheres with their anticipations and retrocipations 
plays an important part. In this context, Dooyeweerd pays 
no attention to his thesis that each law sphere is itself an 
aspect of time. Because that is precisely what I want to do, my 
treatment of the philosophy of history differs significantly 
from Dooyeweerd’s (see Stafleu 2008, 2011).
Like natural evolution, history is much more concentrated 
in the realisation of typical structures than in the opening 
up of modal aspects. Yet, both evolution and history are 
directed by the temporal order expressed at the law side 
of the relation frames. At the subject-and-object side, the 
engine of biotic evolution is heredity. The engines of history 
appear to consist of asymmetric subject–subject relationships 
expressing the transfer of experience in each normative 
relation frame (Stafleu 2011:ch. 2). The above mentioned 
artefacts act as instruments and objective witnesses of 
history. Besides individual persons, associations are actors 
in the historical theatre, the public domain, consisting of 
subjective and objective networks of relationships. All this is 
missing in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy of history.
Artefacts are highly relevant to the philosophy of history 
(Stafleu 2011:ch. 3), if in each relation frame we distinguish 
between artefacts being characterised by that frame and 
other objects which are not. Whereas people and associations 
always act as subjects in all normative relation frames, all 
things, events, situations and processes can be objects in these 
frames. For instance, each thing and each event can be a sign 
as an object in the semiotic relation frame, if a person or an 
association recognises it as such. Only if it is specifically made 
by humans, can we speak of a symbol as a semiotic artefact 
(Stafleu 2011:s. 3.3). Also words, sentences and texts in any 
language are semiotic artefacts. Because theoretical artefacts 
like theories are always expressed in language without being 
reducible to these, I believe that the logical relation frame 
presupposes the semiotic one, the ‘sign aspect’, as Strauss 
(2009:95–96) calls it. Artefacts are not merely relevant for the 
relation frame by which they are characterised. They also play 
an objective and instrumental part in all normative relation 
frames. Without signs, symbols and language, the historical 
investigation of technology, science, social relationships, 
commerce, government and justice would be impossible.
Conceived as human-made objects or events caused by 
people, artefacts have an objective meaning for the history 
of humankind, functioning as instruments in the transfer of 
experience. Artefacts are subjected to the normative order of 
time in the relation frames by which they are characterised, 
like pieces of art, normatively showing aesthetic renewal. 
Because the technical relation frame characterises all artefacts 
either primarily or secondarily, artefacts should at least 
satisfy objectively the historical norm of technical progress 
(Stafleu 2011:s. 1.1). Artefacts have a history of their own, 
constituting an important instrument for historiography as 
the interpretation of signs from the past. Indeed, each artefact 
is an objective sign of the history of the activity of human 
beings as subjective makers and users. Artefacts are objective 
witnesses of the past.
My view of directive time as order for relationships leads 
to a theory of history entirely different from Dooyeweerd’s. 
In PDD, Strauss does not discuss the philosophy of history 
extensively. This makes me wonder whether, regarding this 
topic, he shares Dooyeweerd’s views.
Conclusion
Strauss’s PDD is a fascinating and challenging critical update 
of Herman Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. However, an analysis 
of theoretical thought in the framework of PCI requires 
the insight that concepts, propositions and theories are 
logically characterised artefacts. Also, the development of a 
philosophy of history and a philosophy of technology needs 
the application of artefacts. This insight seems to be absent 
in the works of Dooyeweerd and Strauss. In their analyses of 
theoretical thought, both are too much focused on the modal 
aspects, neglecting the typical structures of reality. This focus 
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led Dooyeweerd to his view of time and history, and both 
Dooyeweerd and Strauss to almost ignoring technology, for 
which their view of the ‘historical’ aspect also seems to be 
responsible. 
Acknowledgements 
Competing interests
The author declares that he has no financial or personal 
relationship(s) that may have inappropriately influenced 
him in writing this article.
References
Achterhuis, H., 1988, Het rijk van de schaarste, van Hobbes tot Foucault, Ambo, 
Amsterdam.
Basden, A., 2005, ‘Brief comments on Stafleu’s proposal for a new political aspect’, 
Philosophia Reformata 70(1), 70–75.
Dooyeweerd, H., 1953–1958, A new critique of theoretical thought, H.J. Paris, 
Amsterdam.
Dooyeweerd, H., 1960, ‘Van Peursen’s critische vragen bij: A new critique of theoretical 
thought’, Philosophia Reformata 25, 97–150.
Duby, G., [1961–1962] 1984, De kathedralenbouwers, Agon, Amsterdam.
Jonas, H., 1979, ‘Toward a philosophy of technology’, reprinted in R.C. Scharff & V. 
Dusek (eds.), 2003, Philosophy of technology: The technological condition: An 
anthology, pp. 191–204, Oxford, Blackwell.
Landes, D.S., 1998, Arm en rijk: Waarom sommige landen erg rijk zijn en andere erg 
arm, Spectrum, Utrecht Norton, New York.
Stafleu, M.D., 1970, ‘Analysis of time in modern physics’, Philosophia Reformata 35, 
1–24, 119–131.
Stafleu, M.D., 1987, Theories at work: On the structure and functioning of theories 
in science, in particular during the Copernican revolution, University Press of 
America, Lanham. PMid:3617962
Stafleu, M.D., 1999, ‘The idea of natural law’, Philosophia Reformata 64, 88–104.
Stafleu, M.D., 2002, Een wereld vol relaties, Buijten en Schipperheijn, Amsterdam.
Stafleu, M.D., 2003, ‘On aesthetically qualified characters and their mutual 
interlacements’, Philosophia Reformata 68, 137–147.
Stafleu, M.D., 2004, ‘On the character of social communities, the state and the public 
domain’, Philosophia Reformata 69, 125–139.
Stafleu, M.D., 2005, ‘The relation frame of keeping company: Reply to Andrew 
Basden’, Philosophia Reformata 70, 151–164.
Stafleu, M.D., 2007, ‘Philosophical ethics and the so-called ethical aspect’, Philosophia 
Reformata 72, 21–33.
Stafleu, M.D., 2008, ‘Time and history in the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea’, 
Philosophia Reformata 73, 154–169.
Stafleu, M.D., 2011, Chronos & Clio, de tijd in de geschiedenis, Buijten en Schipperheijn, 
Amsterdam.
Stafleu, M.D., (in press), ‘Properties, propensities and challenges: Emergence in and 
from the natural world’.
Strauss, D.F.M., 2009, Philosophy: Discipline of the disciplines, Paideia Press, Grand 
Rapids.
Verkerk, M.J., 2004, Trust and power on the shop floor: An ethnographic, ethical and 
philosophical study on responsible behaviour in industrial organizations, Eburon, 
Delft.
Verkerk, M.J., Hoogland, J., Van der Stoep, J. & De Vries, M.J., 2007, Denken, 
ontwerpen, maken: Basisboek techniekfilosofie, Boom, Buijten en Schipperheijn, 
Amsterdam.
Wigner, E.P., 1960, ‘The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural 
sciences’, Communications in Pure and Applied Mathematics 13(1), 1–14. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1002/cpa.3160130102
